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Typhoon Haiyan, the biggest storm ever recorded to hit land, caused major devastation across a wide 
area of the Philippine, affecting more than 14 million people. Oxfam mounted an emergency response 
programme, which included early multi-sector assessments for planning the transition to a development 
phase, primarily in WASH and livelihoods. A number of external and internal challenges have arisen 
during the transition, with lessons for future such responses: early assessment and fund-raising for 
recovery and development; understanding the national context; controlling funding and activities in early 
recovery; and avoiding unsustainable quick-fixes in the recovery phase. 
 
Context 
The Philippines has been classified as a middle-income country, but this can be misleading. There are 
extreme disparities between the rich and the poor, and the national figures are biased by a growth economy 
in some parts compared to the almost feudal nature of the rural economy in many areas, including the 
Eastern Visayas Region which was hardest hit by Typhoon Haiyan and some more recent typhoons. The 
Philippines is ranked 165th in the world in terms of GDP per capita, and almost two million people live on 
less than $2 per day.  
 The Philippines has a well-established decentralised system of government, with tiers of elected local 
government units (LGUs) at province, city, municipality
i
 and barangay. LGUs are responsible for water 
supply and sanitation, which in many places is delegated to “water districts”, semi-autonomous agencies 
regulated by a central Local Water Utilities Administration. The Philippines also has a multiplicity of 
legislation, presidential decrees, regulation, and local ordinances governing the water and sanitation sector. 
This has important implications for the way humanitarian agencies work, or should work, after the initial 
emergency phase is over. 
The Philippine Water Supply Sector Road Map (NEDA, 2010) summarises the major long-term 
challenges:  
 
 The MTPDP [Medium Term Philippine Development Plan] identifies and prioritizes the issues and 
challenges besetting the sector. This include the disparities in water supply coverage across regions, 
depletion of groundwater especially in Metro Manila and Metro Cebu, lack of cost recovery on 
investments, institutional weaknesses and low willingness of consumers to pay. Pollution of water 
sources poses an additional threat to the sustainability of water supply systems and exposes the 
population to the environmentally-related diseases. 
 The sector’s weak ability to respond to the water needs of the population and derivative problems related 
to sanitation, sewerage and wastewater management is rooted in the fragmented institutional 
environment, weak regulatory framework, inadequate support for service providers and utilities resulting 
in low performance levels, weak access to financing and investments, low levels of tariffs and cost 
recovery, inadequate support for rural water supplies, and lack of reliable and updated sector information 
needed for sector planning. 
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Water supply coverage is reported as relatively high, although functionality is a serious problem in many 
places, in particular in lower class and more rural municipalities and their small towns. In many of the areas 
hit by the typhoon sanitation coverage is low, less than 50% in some areas. 
This context and its challenges is significant when addressing the additional challenges resulting from the 
typhoon, with confusion between the emergency, early recovery and rehabilitation needs and the long-term 
development needs. 
 
Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) 
Typhoon Haiyan, named Yolanda in the Philippines, made its first landfall in Guiuan, Eastern Samar at 
04:40 a.m. on 8 November 2013, with ten-minute sustained winds of 230 km/h (145 mph) and unofficially 
estimated one-minute sustained winds of 315 km/h (195 mph). It has been reported as the most powerful 
storm ever recorded to strike land. It went on to make its second landfall in Leyte Island at 07:00 a.m. A 
storm surge in Leyte and Samar was estimated with 5–6 meter high waves. This storm surge devastated 
Tacloban City and the low-lying municipalities to the south. Within days of the disaster the Emergency 
Relief Coordinator of OCHA formally activated a Level 3 response – a designation marking the highest 
level of humanitarian crisis (HPN/ODI, January 2015). The track of the storm is shown in Figure 1. 
 
  
 
Figure 1. Track of Typhoon Haiyan and affected populations, with Oxfam’s programme areas 
 
Source: OCHA/REACH 
 
 
The storm affected 14.9 million people with more than 4 million of these displaced from their destroyed 
homes; 1.2 million houses were damaged. More than 6,000 people were reported dead and more than 26,000 
injured. Livelihoods were severely affected, with more than 1.8 million people in the agriculture sector 
affected and 74% of the fishing communities. This is a significant factor for re-establishing and improving 
WASH service for which people are expected to pay. 
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Oxfam’s emergency response 
Oxfam mounted an emergency response covering WASH, emergency food and sustainable livelihoods 
(EFSVL), and protection, with gender as a cross-cutting issue, in three programme areas: Tacloban and 
eastern Leyte, Guiuan and Eastern Samar, and Bantayan Island and Daanbantayan in Northern Cebu; a 
fourth area in Ormoc and western Leyte was added later. Altogether Oxfam reached about 750,000 
beneficiaries, spending approximately GB£15 million, about half of the more than GB£30 million raised in 
the early fund-raising.  
In WASH, as well as major distributions of water kits and hygiene kits; water trucking and provision of 
emergency tanks; construction of emergency toilets in relocation sites; and hygiene promotion campaigns, 
Oxfam with UNICEF provided modest but critical support to Leyte Metro Water District to enable it to re-
establish water supplies to Tacloban and other municipalities; this was a major factor in averting epidemic 
disease outbreaks. Oxfam also established and operated two septage treatment facilities, treating sludge from 
institutional septic tanks and fresh excreta from emergency toilets with hydrated lime. 
 
Multi-Sector Assessments for the recovery into development phases 
From 18 December 2013 to mid-January 2014, within two months of the emergency, Oxfam carried out 
Multi-Sector Assessments (MSAs) covering protection, EFSVL, WASH, gender and policy/advocacy in 
three of the programme areas to assess needs for the recovery into development phases. The team was made 
up of internal specialists, who were not directly involved in the emergency response, for each of these, led 
by the author, who is a WASH development specialist with some experience in emergencies, rather than a 
specialist humanitarian. The MSAs were constrained because it was only possible to make short visits and 
timing was not ideal, being over the Christmas and New Year period. A debriefing was given in each 
programme area at end of visit and a tabulated summary issued within a few days of completion of field 
work.  
With limited availability of information, the assessment team tried to provide an analysis of the pre-
typhoon and the emergency contexts and the issues in gender, shelter, WASH, food security and livelihoods, 
organisations and institutions, and finance for moving from early recovery to development and disaster risk 
reduction (DRR). The MSA reports included sections with proposals for potential interventions for an early 
recovery phase and a development programme. It was an important innovation for Oxfam to conduct such 
assessments so early in response. The MSAs proved to be very useful for developing the longer term 
response strategy but it needs more time and resources to conduct them effectively. 
 
The planned WASH Programme 
The MSAs were the basis for the WASH strategy that was developed subsequently. Due to lack of time, it 
was not possible to do a thorough study of lessons from previous disasters; the WASH programme was 
developed more in the awareness of previous inadequacies in such responses rather than from specific 
lessons, and included the author’s knowledge of WASH in the Philippines from previous work there. The 
WASH Strategy included components as shown in Figure 2, to contribute to the Government of the 
Philippines’ intention of “building back better”. 
The national staffing needs for the development programme more or less matched the numbers already 
employed in the emergency and early recovery phases. Oxfam’s intention was to retain and retrain these 
staff for development WASH, so that it would have people experienced in emergency response as surge 
capacity for when, not if, the next disaster strikes. Oxfam also recruited internationally for specialists to 
manage and develop some of the components. 
Figure 2 represents the intention. Achieving this has been difficult, or not possible in some of the 
components, for various external and internal reasons described in the following sections. What is being 
achieved now is a scaled-down programme encompassing CLTS, sanitation marketing with micro-finance 
and septage management in two programme areas, with some scope to add support for water supplies and 
support for small town services and possible solid waste management. 
 
External challenges 
The sheer scale of the needs has been, and still is, a huge challenge. The impact of the Typhoon on already 
weak and inadequate infrastructure is enormous; capacity and capability of institutions (with a few 
exceptions) are also factors. The author’s personal view is that weak institutions are part of weak resilience 
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to disasters, and make the self-rebuilding more difficult and slower. National and local politics is also a 
factor in relationships between institutions. 
Despite the scale of need, it can be a crowded space. The various humanitarian actors have differing and 
contradictory approaches, without considering the impact on overall development in the Philippines. The 
nature of humanitarian agencies and staffing is to try achieve quick fixes, which is necessary for the 
immediate response phase. The problem is that this approach is carried over into the recovery phase and 
transition to the longer term by implementing short, target based programs without sufficient understanding 
of the underlying challenges of sustainability and disaster risk reduction (DRR). An example is the approach 
to sanitation: projects provide new toilets with subsidies mixed into CLTS to meet short-term targets of zero 
open defecation, rather than allowing CLTS to work to create behaviour change and demand and 
establishing supply-side sanitation marketing to meet the demand.  
This short-termism is reflected in attitudes to government policies and regulations. Different agencies are 
developing their own toilet designs, some of which are technically defective, rather than conforming to or 
trying to influence the government’s standards, which are themselves inadequate. Humanitarians still talk 
about meeting Sphere Standards and indicators, rather than following national standards. 
A major factor in the external environment is the lack of skilled engineers. Similar to nursing, Philippines 
is a major exporter of its trained engineers, mainly to the Middle East. Interest in WASH amongst 
engineering graduates is also low – most want to work on structures and major engineering projects. The 
result is that there is a very small pool of WASH specialists for all the agencies to draw from. Many of those 
employed are from a cadre of “construction supervisors” with little previous experience in WASH. 
  
 
 
Figure 2. Oxfam’s WASH Programme 
 
Source: Oxfam 
 
The other factor alluded to in the description of the impact of the typhoon is the ability of people to pay 
for services. In the Eastern Visayas Region where levels of poverty already made this a challenge, people 
have taken a huge hit on their livelihoods and incomes. The challenge of making services affordable has 
grown bigger. 
An ongoing challenge concerns resettlement. Soon after the disaster, the Government declared a “No-
build zone” (NBZ) to prevent people rebuilding within 45m of the shoreline. This has meant relocating 
people, mainly poor fisherfolk, away from their livelihoods. The availability of adequate land for resettling 
these people has been difficult. The thinking behind provision of services for temporary transitional sites and 
the permanent sites represents a particular challenge in sanitation. The Government guidance specifies that a 
toilet should be provided, but the practice is to build septic tanks with little thought about the effluent and 
drainage from the tanks. With the very dense housing, these site are likely to become urban slums with very 
dangerous environmental sanitation very quickly. Oxfam is currently assisting one local government by 
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providing a joined-up sanitation solution consisting of one or two anaerobic baffled reactors (ABRs) serving 
a whole resettlement site of more than 100 houses. Initial estimates indicate that this may actually be a 
cheaper solution than multiple septic tanks, as well as providing a much better quality of effluent. Hopefully 
this pilot demonstration can influence the National Housing Authority to change its guidance to address site 
planning to allow space for such systemic solutions.  
 
Internal factors 
In Oxfam WASH comes under the Humanitarian Department, even though the intention is to also work in 
development WASH. This means that WASH for the development phase is operating in a humanitarian 
culture. An example is the recruitment of international specialists: Oxfam is seen by job seekers as a 
humanitarian organisation, and jobs were initially advertised on inappropriate recruitment sites. Short term 
contracts (12 months) may deter development people, and there is a need to consider accompanied posts.  
During the early recovery phase, short-term staff were doing things that are more appropriate in the 
development phase. These included provision of new toilets and water supplies, which were not developed 
with the necessary processes and considerations to make them sustainable. Part of this was due to the 
imperative of meeting targets set during the emergency phase – staff were chasing targets that were no 
longer relevant. Part of it was also having generous budgets available with the push to spend (“burn rates” 
per staff being a measure of effectiveness in humanitarian work) rather than conserving the funds for the 
later stage of “building back better”. 
Spending during the early recovery and transition phases used up more of the funding than originally 
planned. One of the clear lessons is that fund-raising for the development phase needs to start much earlier, 
even while the emergency response in in progress; donors need to be influenced in this respect.  
 
Conclusions 
Working in the transition to development after a major disaster is challenging. Although it is Oxfam’s policy 
to do this at scale, it has not been possible to fully demonstrate the achievement of this policy intention in 
the response to Typhoon Haiyan. A number of important lessons can, however, be identified in the trying. 
Amongst these are: 
 conducting MSAs early in the emergency were important for setting the overall direction of the response 
 fund-raising for the development phase early in the response, including advocacy with donors for this  
 a change in culture of humanitarians to consider the development context and need for developmental 
approaches to achieve sustainability and DRR. 
 humanitarian actors need to understand the context in which the response is taking place 
 Activities and spending in the early recovery need to be controlled so that funds are not spent on things 
that need a longer term developmental approach to be sustainable. 
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Note/s 
1
 A municipality is an administrative area. It can be urban, or rural with some urban barangays forming a 
small town. 
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